Abstract -We estimate how much of the wealth of a sample of respondents to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics is held because some households face more income uncertainty than others. We begin by solving a theoretical model of saving, which we use to develop appropriate measures of uncertainty. We then regress households' wealth on our measures of uncertainty, and find substantial evidence that households engage in precautionary saving. Finally, we simulate the wealth distribution that our empirical results imply would prevail if all households had the same uncertainty as the lowest uncertainty group. We find that between 32 and 50% of wealth in our sample is attributable to the extra uncertainty that some consumers face compared to the lowest uncertainty group.
I. Introduction
S EVERAL recent empirical papers have attempted to determine the proportion of either aggregate or household wealth attributable to precautionary saving. Unfortunately, theoretically plausible precautionary saving models are difficult to solve and have been thought to imply no well-defined relationship between wealth and any simple measure of uncertainty. 1 Empirical papers have therefore used theoretically implausible models whose chief appeal is that they generate a closed-form solution to serve as an econometric specification. 2 The range of results obtained using such models is disturbingly large: Guiso et al. (1992) state that ''precautionary saving accounts for 2 percent of households' net worth,'' whereas Dardanoni (1991) claims that ''more than 60 percent of savings . . . arise as a precaution against future income risk. '' 3 A major obstacle to empirical estimation of theoretically attractive models has been that theory provides no analytical result that tells the researcher exactly how to measure uncertainty in a parsimonious way. In principle, optimal behavior depends on even the minutest details of the income distribution, so that, for example, two distributions that exhibit the same mean and variance might induce quite different precautionary saving. The first contribution of this paper is to show that, in practice, if households behave according to a ''buffer-stock'' model of saving like that described in Deaton (1991) or Carroll (1992 Carroll ( , 1997 , there are at least two simple measures of uncertainty that are highly correlated with the ''target'' amount of precautionary wealth that consumers will seek to hold. The first measure is based on a theoretical construct derived by Kimball (1990a) , the equivalent precautionary premium (EPP); the second is an atheoretical measure, the log of the variance of the log of income (LVARLY). We show that the buffer-stock model predicts a roughly linear relationship between the log of target wealth and either LVARLY or the log of a normalized version of the EPP that we call the relative equivalent precautionary premium (LREPP).
Armed with this specification, we next turn to empirical estimation of the relationship between wealth and uncertainty. For each household in our Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) sample, we calculate an estimate of LREPP and LVARLY, and then, using instrumental variables to overcome substantial measurement error problems, we estimate the empirical relationship between log wealth and LREPP and LVARLY. For our sample of consumers younger than age 50, 4 we find a statistically significant relationship between all tested measures of wealth and both measures of uncertainty.
In the final section we use our empirical estimates to answer the question posed in the title of the paper. We find that setting the uncertainty of every household to the smallest predicted uncertainty for any household would reduce total net worth of households under 50 by about 45%; would reduce their net worth exclusive of housing and business equity by 50%; and would reduce their holdings of very liquid assets by 32%.
II. Theoretical Framework

A. The Consumer's Intertemporal Optimization Problem
The model of precautionary saving that forms the basis of our empirical work is a variant of the buffer-stock models developed by Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992 Carroll ( , 1997 . Carroll (1992 Carroll ( , 1997 shows that these models imply that consumers will have a target wealth-to-income ratio such that if wealth is above the target, consumption will exceed income and wealth will fall, and if wealth is below the target, income will exceed consumption and wealth will rise. Carroll (1992) argues that this model is consistent with a variety of characteristics of macroeconomic data on consumption and saving, and Carroll (1994 Carroll ( , 1997 , Carroll and Samwick (1997) , and Gourinchas and Parker (1996) find support for the model using microeconomic data.
The particular version of the buffer-stock model considered here imposes liquidity constraints directly, as in Deaton (1991) , although similar results can be obtained in a version without liquidity constraints. 5 Specifically, the consumer is assumed to solve the following problem:
subject to
where X t ϭ Y t ϩ W t is the stock of physical resources available for spending in period t, R ϭ 1 ϩ r is the gross interest rate, ␤ ϭ 1/(1 ϩ ␦) is the discount factor (␦ being the discount rate), Y t is the total labor income of the household in period t, P is the permanent labor income of the household (that is, the income that would be earned if there were no transitory shocks), and V t is the multiplicative transitory shock to income in period t. The utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form, u(c) ϭ c (1 Ϫ ) / (1 Ϫ ), where is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We assume that the V t are identically and independently distributed and will use empirical distribution functions calculated from the PSID data to estimate the distribution of the V t . 6 Our choice of a CRRA utility function guarantees that the consumers in this model will engage in precautionary saving; the coefficient of relative risk aversion indexes the strength of both risk aversion and prudence. The drawback of assuming CRRA utility is that there is no closed-form solution for the level of consumption, wealth, or saving as a function of uncertainty. We therefore must solve the model numerically. The principal necessary condition for generating bufferstock saving behavior is that, if income were certain, consumers would wish to spend more than their current income. The analytical condition which guarantees this in the continuous-time version of the model with only transitory shocks to income is Ϫ1 (r Ϫ ␦) Ͻ g, where g is the expected growth rate of income (see Carroll (1996) for a derivation). 7 The particular values we choose for solving the model are ϭ 3, ␦ ϭ 0.04, r ϭ 0, and g ϭ 0.02 (drawn from Carroll (1992 Carroll ( , 1997 ), but the results of the analysis in this section are similar under a broad range of other parameter values so long as consumers are prudent ( Ͼ 0) and impatient ( Ϫ1 (r Ϫ ␦) Ͻ g).
B. Measuring Income Uncertainty
The only measure of uncertainty that is based even loosely on the theory of precautionary saving is the EPP defined by Kimball (1990a) . Suppose consumption is distributed randomly with a multiplicative shock X around a level c, c ϭ cX. In this case, in a two-period model Kimball's EPP is defined by the amount such that
Kimball shows that the EPP is, in essence, a direct measure of the intensity of the precautionary saving motive at the point of zero precautionary saving. Under our CRRA utility function, uЈ(c) ϭ c Ϫ , implying that we can solve for ,
For our later empirical purposes, a scaleless measure of relative uncertainty is more useful; such a measure is given by /c ϭ 1 Ϫ E[X Ϫ ] Ϫ1/ . We will call this measure the relative equivalent precautionary premium (REPP). Because total consumption is not reported in the PSID, we cannot construct a measure of uncertainty that corresponds exactly to the REPP. 8 Instead, we follow Carroll (1994) in substituting permanent and actual income for average and actual consumption, respectively, in the REPP formula. Strictly speaking, this measure would be identical to the true REPP only if the household always consumed exactly its income. 9 Our second candidate measure of uncertainty is the variance of income. Previous work has usually assumed that utility is CARA (i.e., u(c) ϭ Ϫexp(Ϫc)/), and that the shock to income is additive and distributed normally with a variance of 2 . These assumptions have been motivated not by plausibility but by the fact that they imply an exact linear relationship between consumption and uncertainty; in particu- 5 We chose to impose liquidity constraints here because it simplifies the task of constructing an appropriate distribution function for the income shocks; see the discussion below of our kernel estimates of the distribution function. 6 We also discuss the consequences for our results if there is a permanent as well as a transitory component to income shocks. 7 The discrete-time version is (R␤) Ϫ1/ Ͻ G, where G ϭ 1 ϩ g. The economic logic behind these equations is as follows. A standard result for the continuous-time CRRA utility model without income uncertainty or liquidity constraints is that the desired growth rate of consumption is Ϫ1 (r Ϫ ␦). Consider a consumer with zero assets. If the desired growth rate of consumption is below the growth rate of income, then if the intertemporal budget constraint is to be satisfied, it must be true that the level of consumption is above the level of income, and so such a consumer would be running down his net worth.
8 Food consumption and selected other components of consumption are measured, but the quality of these data is too poor to produce credible results about the extent of uncertainty.
9 Because prudent households build up a buffer stock of assets precisely to insure consumption against shocks to income, the random element in consumption will be less variable than Y i,t . lar, under these assumptions the EPP has a theoretical value of 2 /2. 10 The final measure of uncertainty we examine is the variance of the log of income. While there is no formal theoretical justification for using this measure, we examine it because it is relatively easy to calculate and is perhaps the most familiar measure of variability.
C. Estimating Alternative Distribution Functions for Income Shocks
In order to examine the model's predictions about the relationship between target wealth and income uncertainty, we must solve the model under an array of different assumptions about the distribution of shocks to income. We therefore turned to the PSID, which contains the kind of panel data on income necessary to determine empirically what the distribution of shocks to income looks like. Our method was as follows. We divided our PSID sample into subsamples corresponding to the eight occupation categories, twelve industry categories, and six education categories to which the head of household could belong, for a total of 26 different groups. 11 For each household i, we calculated V i,t as the ratio of observed income in year t to the mean (detrended) income over all seven years of the sample period. We treated each of these as an independent realization of V. Thus, if there are n households in a given group, this technique produces 7n observations on V for that group. The empirical cumulative distribution functions of these V's for each of the 26 groups were then approximated by 20-point kernel estimators. Using these kernel estimates of the distribution of shocks to income for each of the 26 groups, we then solved the buffer-stock model described above and calculated the model's implied target wealth-toincome ratio. We also calculated the average value of the REPP, the variance of income (VARY ), and the variance of the log of income (VARLY ) for each of the categories.
D. Target Wealth as a Function of Uncertainty
Even the theoretically preferred measure of uncertainty, the REPP, does not have a closed-form analytical relationship with the target wealth-to-income ratio, so further theoretical work is required to find an appropriate specification to characterize the relationship between uncertainty and wealth.
Define w* as the target wealth-to-income ratio predicted by the theoretical model. Indexing the income distributions by j ϭ 1 to 26, we calculate for each income distribution, the associated value of the REPP j , and then we solve the theoretical model to find the target w* j that the model implies consumers would wish to hold if they faced that income distribution. Figure 1a plots the resulting (REPP j , w* j ) pairs. Figure 1b plots w* j against VARY j , the theoretically appropriate measure of uncertainty under CARA utility. VARY is clearly not as closely related to target wealth as is REPP, as expected from the theoretical discussion. Figure 1c plots w* j against VARLY j . Somewhat to our surprise, this atheoretical measure of uncertainty appears to perform almost as well as REPP in explaining target wealth holdings. 10 Because the shock is additive rather than multiplicative, there is no reason to scale the EPP by c to get the REPP. Using Kimball's notation, the EPP() is determined by the equation
. 11 All consumers in our data set thus appear in three of these groups, one corresponding to their occupation, one to their education, and one to their industry group. We could not subdivide the sample much further because in order to estimate a distribution function precisely it is necessary to have a relatively large number of observations of the process. Table 1 formalizes the message of the figures using regressions of w* on the various measures of income uncertainty. The first three lines of the table represent the regressions whose fitted lines are plotted in figure 1. Although all three measures of uncertainty are highly correlated with w*, the table confirms that the variance of the (detrended real) level of income (the measure that has been used in most previous empirical studies of precautionary saving) is much less useful in explaining w* than is either REPP or VARLY. Indeed, both REPP and VARLY perform extremely well, with R 2 values of better than 0.99. 12 The second set of regressions considers the relationship in log-log rather than in level-level form. Results are very similar to the level-level specification, with both the log of REPP (LREPP) and the log of VARLY (LVARLY ) generating R 2 values in excess of 0.99.
Because wealth is highly unequally distributed, we chose to use the log-log specification as the baseline framework for empirical estimation. For simplicity, in our empirical work we wished to narrow the field of potential measures of uncertainty to two. We chose to keep LREPP for its theoretical appeal and LVARLY because it is an atheoretical measure of uncertainty that performs almost as well as LREPP. Hence our empirical work estimates equations based on the regressions in rows (4) and (6) of Table 1 , 13, 14 log 1
where is a measure of uncertainty, either LREPP or LVARLY.
III. Empirical Estimation of the Model
A. Basic Specification
Adding log(P) to both sides of equation (2) and adding an error term gives
Our final specification is a slightly more general version of this equation,
where the Z variables are demographic controls for age, race, sex, marital status, and the number of children.
The buffer-stock model of saving presented above assumes that there is only one, perfectly liquid, asset. The model's predictions about target wealth concern total net worth held in this single asset. We therefore estimate equation (4) using total net worth (NW) as the dependent variable. In reality, of course, consumers can invest in a wide range of assets which differ, among other ways, in their degree of liquidity. Illiquid assets may be less useful as a safeguard against bad income shocks because of the extra time or money required to turn them into the cash needed to meet emergency expenses or to replace income. It would therefore not be surprising to find that holdings of more liquid assets are more sensitive to uncertainty. Consequently, we also estimate equation (4) for two progressively more liquid measures of wealth (the exact components of which are detailed in the appendix): (1) net worth excluding equity in the main home and in personally owned businesses (nonhousing, nonbusiness wealth, NHNBW) and (2) very liquid assets (VLA), which can be liquidated on short notice with small transactions costs.
In the absence of a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates liquidity, we simply note that the proposition 12 One possible objection to our procedure for constructing REPP and relating target wealth to it is that we used the same in solving the model and in constructing our measure of REPP. When using REPP to analyze actual household wealth data, we do not know the ''true'' value of . Our procedure would be problematic if the relationship between REPP calculated with a given were a bad indicator of the target wealth that would result from assuming a different . We checked whether this was a problem by calculating REPP under several different plausible assumptions about , and regressing the target wealth generated for our baseline value of on the REPP calculated for nonbaseline values of . In all cases we found R 2 values not much different from those in table 1. In our later empirical results we also experimented with different values of and found little difference in the econometric results. 13 We also performed the analysis using all the measures of uncertainty in table 1. We found that results for LREPP, LVARLY, and LVARY were approximately equally good, and the results for all of these measures were substantially better than the results for the other three measures.
14 One way to gauge how problematic our assumption of independent shocks may be is to examine the consequences if there are both transitory and permanent shocks to income, but we nevertheless use the procedures outlined above to construct measures of uncertainty and then regress log w* on those measures of uncertainty. We report the results of this experiment in the working paper version of this paper (Carroll and Samwick (1995) ). We find that there is still an approximately linear relationship between LREPP or LVARLY and the log of the target wealth ratio. that precautionary balances should be held in highly liquid forms is not necessarily correct. If the main motivation in holding precautionary assets is to self-insure against rare but large shocks to income (such as a prolonged spell of unemployment), 15 it may well be worthwhile to pay the transactions costs required to liquidate illiquid assets in the rare case that such an awful event actually occurs. Moreover, because our VLA measure does not subtract any debts from the measured assets, it is only weakly related to the concept of net worth in our model. As a result, the case for preferring one measure of wealth over the other two is not particularly strong. Because our econometric specification was derived from a model in which all consumers engage in buffer-stock saving, our estimating equation is justified only for a data sample in which households can plausibly be expected to be bufferstock savers. Carroll (1992 Carroll ( , 1997 , Samwick (1994) , and Carroll and Samwick (1997) argue that a variety of empirical evidence is consistent with the view that households engage in buffer-stock saving behavior until roughly age 50, but behave differently in the years immediately preceding retirement. In order to obtain a sample in which theory suggests consumers might conform to the model, we initially limit our sample to households in which the head is no older than 50 during the sample period.
The final issue to be addressed before presenting the estimation results is the nature and justification of the instrumenting procedure used. Because at the level of the individual household both uncertainty and permanent income are unquestionably measured with considerable error, they must be instrumented if we are to obtain consistent coefficient estimates. Our instrument set contains dummies for the occupation, education, and industry of the head of household in 1981, along with the demographic variables already contained in Z. We also interacted the occupation and education variables with the age and age-squared terms in order to allow for different lifetime profiles of income and uncertainty for different occupation and educational groups. (The set of instruments is described fully in the appendix.)
Results for our estimates of equation (4) for all three measures of wealth and for both measures of uncertainty are presented in table 2. 16 The coefficients on the LREPP and LVARLY terms are highly significant for all three measures of wealth, with VLA receiving a somewhat lower coefficient than NHNBW or NW. 17 The statistical significance of the uncertainty terms increases as the measure of wealth becomes more comprehensive, and for a given wealth measure, the coefficients on the LREPP and LVARLY terms are of approximately equal statistical significance. 18 The coefficient estimates on LREPP and LVARLY are both about two-thirds as large as predicted in table 1, although the difference is often not statistically significant. Furthermore, if solved under alternative assumptions about the income process, the model can produce coefficients even closer to 15 Carroll (1992) solves a buffer-stock model with lognormal shocks to annual transitory and permanent income and with a small probability that income goes to zero for the entire year, which he interprets as long spells of unemployment. Despite the assumption that such events are very rare, he finds that a large fraction of the buffer is attributable to the fear of these zero-income events rather than to the annual transitory and permanent shocks. 16 In constructing LREPP we assumed a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3, for consistency with the simulation results in table 1. We also tried coefficients of 2 and 5; the empirical results were not materially different.
17 Heteroskedasticity tests rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 5% level, so all standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
18 These variables are also highly correlated with each other, and regressions (not reported) in which both measures are included find that neither measure is individually significant. the empirical coefficients (see Carroll and Samwick (1995, Our instrumental-variables specification is econometrically identified by the exclusion of occupation, education, and industry variables from the regression of wealth on uncertainty. We test this exclusion assumption by performing the standard heteroskedasticity-robust overidentification (OID) test from Hansen (1982) ; results are reported in the last column of table 2. In only one case (NW on LREPP) does the OID test (barely) reject the model at the 5% level. 19 This exclusion restriction assumes that these variables have no predictive power for wealth other than through their correlations with permanent income and with uncertainty. Carroll (1997) shows that in buffer-stock models the target wealth-to-income ratio is indeed determined largely by the degree of uncertainty and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and is comparatively insensitive to the growth rate of income, the interest rate, and other variables which may also differ systematically across the industry-occupationeducation groups in our sample. In this framework it would not be surprising to find in empirical work that instruments have little explanatory power for wealth beyond the information they contain about uncertainty. 20 As a robustness check of the results in table 2, table 3 reports the coefficient estimate on LREPP and the standard error and t-statistic when we make a variety of changes in our sample and specification (results were similar when LVARLY was the measure of uncertainty). Results for all tests are first presented for the case where the measure of wealth is VLA, then for NHNBW, and then for NW.
When we extend the sample to include consumers who were over age 50 in 1981 (but still younger than 63 during our sample period), the coefficient estimates and their statistical significance increase for all three measures of wealth. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the buffer-stock model. Carroll and Samwick (1997) show that a buffer-stock model implies that wealth is considerably more responsive to uncertainty in the immediate preretirement period than during the earlier part of the life cycle.
The next set of experiments reports the results when farmers and the self-employed are excluded from the sample. When both groups are excluded, the coefficient estimate on LREPP declines-by 50 and 60% for VLA and NHNBW, respectively, and almost to 0 for NW. They are also no longer significantly different from zero. When either farmers or the self-employed remain in the sample, however, the coefficient estimates remain relatively close to their initial values and retain a high degree of statistical significance.
The final set of tests adds the occupation and then the education instruments to the set of control variables. When occupation is added, the results are generally similar to the results when farmers and the self-employed are excluded from the sample. Further data analysis indicates that the effect on the coefficient estimate is, as one might expect, primarily the result of the dummies for farmers and the self-employed. When education is added (and occupation again excluded), there is little effect on the coefficient estimates or their significance.
The sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of farmers and the self-employed bears closer examination. As indicated in the appendix (see table A.3), both measures of uncertainty are much higher for these two groups than for any other occupation groups. Tabulations of wealth (mean, median, or other quantiles) by occupation find that these two groups are substantially richer than the rest of the population. What we learn from the regressions is that there are apparently no other covariates included in our control set that explain why these two groups have high wealth. Our preferred interpretation of these findings is of course that farmers and the self-employed provide exactly the kind of variation in the independent variable that is very valuable in identifying the coefficient on uncertainty, and hence these groups should remain in the sample.
Two well-known previous studies (Friedman (1957) and Skinner (1988) ) failed to find higher than average saving for farmers and the self-employed, and speculated that consumers who are risk averse tend to avoid these two occupations because of the great income uncertainty they exhibit. Both of these studies, however, used measures of flow saving (income minus consumption) rather than wealth. Measurement error for flow saving is likely to be particularly severe, however, for these two groups, partly because of the difficulty of distinguishing business expenditures (on motor vehicles, for instance) from personal consumption. Of course, it remains possible that there is a selection effect of the kind Friedman and Skinner speculated about (risk lovers start businesses; risk lovers do not do much precautionary saving). If present, however, such an effect would bias our coefficient estimates downward relative to the true coefficients. The reader should therefore bear in mind that, to the extent that such selection effects exist, our estimates of the extent of precautionary saving may be too small. 21
IV. How Would Wealth Change if There Were
Less Uncertainty?
The econometric estimates of the sensitivity of wealth to uncertainty in table 2 can be used to determine the impact of income uncertainty on the aggregate wealth distribution for the consumers in our sample. We use the empirical model to simulate the distribution of wealth that would prevail if all households faced the same, small amount of uncertainty, instead of the amount of uncertainty they actually faced in our data. 22 (Of course this is a ceteris paribus exercise; in practice it is likely that there would be general-equilibrium effects, particularly on the interest rate, that would complicate the effects of the reduction in uncertainty, but a general-equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Our method was as follows. The second-stage regressions presented in table 2 using the LREPP generate a wealth equation for each household, 23
where LREPP i is the instrumented estimate of income uncertainty. The equation fits exactly because the estimation errors v i are defined as the difference between the predicted value of log wealth and the actual value. 24 We construct a new measure of wealth W* i such that
which should tell us how wealth would change if uncertainty were to change from LREPP i to LREPP*. Implications about the aggregate wealth distribution can then be derived by aggregating up these simulated values for all the individual households.
Our choice for LREPP* is the minimum predicted value of LREPP i in the sample. 25 This corresponds to the uncertainty that would be faced by the consumer in the sample with the least risky set of characteristics, such as a high degree of education or a job in public administration. Figure  2 plots the simulated values of the log(NHNBW ) measure of wealth against the true distribution of log(NHNBW). Specifically, two points are plotted for each household in the sample: (w i , p i ) and (w* i , p i ), where p i indicates the percentile ranking for household i in the true wealth distribution, w i indicates the log of actual wealth W i , and w* i indicates the simulated value of the log of wealth for that household when LREPP i is set to the chosen value of LREPP* (i.e., log(W* i ) in equation (6)). All simulated wealth points lie to the left of the actual wealth distribution, because everyone's uncertainty has been reduced (except any household that already had the minimum predicted value of LREPP).
Simulated aggregate wealth is given by the sum of the simulated wealth of the individual households. The top panel of table 4 shows how aggregate wealth in our sample would change if everyone's uncertainty were set to LREPP*. The first row shows that reducing every household's uncertainty to the minimum predicted value reduces aggregate VLA by 32%, aggregate NHNBW by 50%, and NW by 45%. The next three rows of the table present the results for simulations in which LREPP* is set to the 10th, 25th, and 50th percentiles of LREPP i 's predicted value. 26 21 There is another possible selection problem with farmers and selfemployed, which might be termed ''survival bias.'' Even if the less risk averse go into farming and self-employment, those who survive (as measured by the PSID) may have high wealth, that is, those who experience the largest negative shocks switch to a less risky occupation. Such a selection generates a correlation between income variability and wealth that has nothing to do with precautionary behavior and causes the baseline estimates to overestimate the precautionary effect. 22 We did not set uncertainty to zero because the model's coefficient estimates were obtained in a region of the data very far from zero uncertainty, and it is well known that even models that perform well in sample can do a very poor job forecasting behavior in regions far from the space spanned by the data sample. 23 The simulation results were similar when we used LVARLY. 24 These v i are the residuals from the second stage of the two-stage least-squares regressions; they are not the instrumental-variables residuals. 25 Recall that the LREPP i here are the predicted, not measured, values of LREPP. If we were to use the measured values, we would be likely to choose a consumer for whom measurement error in uncertainty was large and negative. 26 Given the sensitivity of the coefficients on LREPP to the inclusion of occupation variables in the instrument set rather than as explanatory variables, we can use the estimates from the ''Occupation In'' specification to construct lower bounds for the effect of uncertainty on wealth. Noting that the coefficients from this specification are 0.33, 0.66, and 0.39 times Statements about how aggregate wealth would change in our sample are a good guide to the effects on aggregate wealth in the U.S. population only if our sample is representative of the population. Carroll and Samwick (1995) perform detailed comparisons of the demographic and other household characteristics of our PSID sample to the corresponding statistics in the population, and generally find that our sample is very similar to the comparable portion of the population. Curtin et al. (1989) present a detailed comparison of the PSID and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) measures of wealth, and find that the PSID agrees with the SCF over most of the distribution of wealth; only at the top end do the surveys differ significantly. The discrepancy at the top is not surprising; in large part, the SCF was developed because the existing wealth surveys (like the PSID) tend to underestimate wealth at the very top of the distribution.
If the difference between the aggregate estimates of wealth in the PSID and the SCF is entirely due to the PSID's undersampling of the wealthy, it is possible to use the information in the SCF to calculate a lower bound on the precautionary component of U.S. aggregate wealth for consumers like those in our sample by assuming that none of the wealth missed by the PSID is precautionary wealth. The second panel of table 4 presents such lower bound estimates for the under-50 population in the United States. We find that setting uncertainty to the lowest predicted value in the sample would reduce VLA by 20%, NHNBW by 51%, and NW by 37%. 27
V. Conclusion
The absence of a simple measure of uncertainty that embodies all of the relevant characteristics of a stochastic income distribution has plagued empirical analyses of precautionary saving. The first contribution of this paper is to show that if consumers behave according to a buffer-stock model of saving and face plausible distributions of income shocks, the relationship between the log of target wealth and income uncertainty should be approximately linear when the measure of income uncertainty is based on either the log of Kimball's (1990a) relative equivalent precautionary premium (LREPP) or the log of the variance of the log of income (LVARLY). Our principal econometric finding is that wealth holdings are indeed positively and significantly related to income uncertainty for various measures of wealth and both the LREPP and the LVARLY measures of uncertainty.
Simulations of the econometric model suggest that approximately 45% of total net worth, half of nonhousing, nonbusiness wealth, and about one-third of very liquid assets of households younger than age 50 are held as a precaution against the systematically greater uncertainty that some households face as compared with others. Our finding that less of very liquid assets than of nonhousing, nonbusiness wealth is attributable to precautionary saving suggests that the bulk of precautionary saving exists to insure against relatively large shocks-perhaps substantial spells of unemployment-compared to which the cost of liquidating illiquid assets is small.
An important limitation of our approach is that it does not directly address the question of the proportion of the wealth of consumers over age 50 (or of the entire population) that can be attributed to precautionary saving behavior. However, our empirical results (and those of Carroll (1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1997) ) are consistent with a parameterization of the life cycle model under uncertainty, which implies that consumers engage in buffer-stock saving behavior until around age 50 and switch over to traditional life cycle retirement saving thereafter. A natural extension would be to estimate the proportion of total wealth attributable to uncertainty, or to differentials in uncertainty across households, by performing simulations like those of Hubbard et al. (1994 Hubbard et al. ( , 1995 , but under parameter values that generate buffer-stock saving behavior consistent with our empirical results for consumers under the age of 50.
the baseline coefficients for the VLA, NHNBW, and NW, the lower bounds for the effect of uncertainty on wealth are 11, 33, and 18%, respectively. 27 The adjustment factors, representing the ratio of PSID to SCF wealth in each category, are 0.64 for VLA, 1.02 for NHNBW, and 0.81 for NW. The 1.02 figure for NHNBW reflects the fact that the PSID misses a substantial amount of debt at the upper reaches of the income distribution, and so it overestimates NHNBW compared to the SCF. (1) Each cell contains the percent reduction in wealth holdings were each household to face an LREPP equal to the value of the LREPP at the specified percentile of the predicted LREPP distribution instead of its actual LREPP.
(2) The calculation for the U.S. population is a lower bound because it is based on the assumption that, of the wealth that the PSID misses, none is precautionary wealth. 
